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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNN) are growing in capa-
bility and applicability. Their effectiveness has led to their use in
safety critical and autonomous systems, yet there is a dearth of
cost-effective methods available for reasoning about the behavior
of a DNN.
In this paper, we seek to expand the applicability and scal-
ability of existing DNN verification techniques through DNN
refactoring. A DNN refactoring defines (a) the transformation
of the DNN’s architecture, i.e., the number and size of its layers,
and (b) the distillation of the learned relationships between the
input features and function outputs of the original to train the
transformed network. Unlike with traditional code refactoring,
DNN refactoring does not guarantee functional equivalence of
the two networks, but rather it aims to preserve the accuracy of
the original network while producing a simpler network that is
amenable to more efficient property verification.
We present an automated framework for DNN refactoring,
and demonstrate its potential effectiveness through three case
studies on networks used in autonomous systems.
Index Terms—neural networks, verification, architecture,
knowledge distillation
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has emerged over the past decade as a means
of synthesizing implementations of complex classification [1],
clustering [2], and control functions [3], [4]. These imple-
mentations, in the form of Deep Neural Networks (DNN),
offer the potential for new or enhanced system capability.
For example, functions that compute control outputs from bit-
mapped images have been synthesized that can outperform a
trained human on a range of complex “game playing” tasks [3],
[4] and those techniques have been adapted to replace heuristic
and human control in autonomous systems [5], [6].
As these techniques mature they are being deployed in
safety critical systems. However, there is a lack of cost-
effective techniques for reasoning about the behavior of DNNs
which, in turn, limits the development of safety arguments
for such systems and is a cause for concern, e.g., automo-
tive industry standards are under scrutiny for not addressing
DNNs [7]. To address this need, researchers have been actively
exploring algorithms for verifying that the behavior of a
trained DNN meets explicitly stated correctness properties.
ReLuplex [8] and Planet [9] were the first such tools, but
more than 18 DNN verification algorithms [10], [11], [12],
[13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23],
[24], [25] have been developed in the past two years.
Despite this progress, the state-of-the-art in DNN verifica-
tion is far from adequate for addressing the scale and complex-
ity of DNNs used in autonomous systems. As we demonstrate
in §IV, networks such as DAVE-2 [26] and DroNet [27],
56 89A 01 56789A original
e m
a
x
High Bias High Variance
DNN Complexity (e.g., #weights, #neurons)
E
rr
or
(—
)
t m
a
x
complexity
sweet spot
V
er
ifi
ca
tio
n
Ti
m
e
(–
–)
Fig. 1: Conceptual diagram depicting (a) the bias-variance
tradeoff in deep-learning and (b) the growth in verification
time with model complexity.
which are used in autonomous driving and autonomous UAV
navigation, are too complex for cost-effective verification.
Balancing Error and Verifiability: Fig. 1 illustrates, with
the solid curve, a conceptual plot of the classic bias-variance
tradeoff in training a machine learning model [28]. While
there are many possible measures of complexity of a machine
learning model, for training a DNN one can understand
complexity in terms of the number of parameters, or weights,
that are learned. This plot captures the intuition that: (a)
low complexity networks have insufficient capacity to fit the
training data (high-bias), and (b) high complexity networks
risk overfitting the training data (high-variance). The plot also
reflects that, in practice, DNNs tend not to overfit until their
complexity becomes very large relative to the training data,
e.g., [29], [30], [31]. This has the effect of extending the region
of low error far to the right in terms of Fig. 1.
For developers who are focused exclusively on low error
(high accuracy) this means that there is little disincentive
to adding neurons, and thereby additional parameters, to
the DNN in the hopes of achieving lower error. However,
for developers who seek both low error and the ability to
verify properties, increasing DNN complexity, e.g., by adding
neurons, can substantially increase verification time. Fig. 1
illustrates, with the dashed curve, a conceptual plot of the
growth in verification time with increasing DNN complexity
– Fig. 5 in §IV reports data substantiating the growth in
verification time with the number of neurons.
Consider a developer who needs a DNN with error less than
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Fig. 2: The R4V Approach
emax and who is willing to wait tmax for verification results.
Conceptually, these constraints define a lower bound on DNN
complexity, i.e., the complexity necessary to achieve lower
error than emax, and an upper bound on DNN complexity,
i.e., the complexity beyond which verification time exceeds
tmax. These bounds define a complexity sweet spot within
which a DNN is both accurate and verifiable. In this paper, we
propose automated support that developers can use to navigate
error-verifiability tradeoffs resulting from DNN complexity to
produce a network within this sweet spot.
Refactoring for Verification: To achieve this we adapt
the concept of refactoring to deep neural networks. Code
refactoring [32] typically seeks to (a) restructure a software
system to facilitate subsequent development activities, while
(b) preserving the behavior of the original software system.
Fowler’s original focus was on improving maintainability and
extensibility, but researchers have adapted the concept in
myriad ways. For example, to enhance the testability [33],
[34] and verification [35] of software.
DNN refactoring for verification (R4V) applies and adapts
the basic principles of code refactoring. As depicted in Fig. 2,
given an original trained DNN, refactoring proceeds in two
phases: architectural transformation and weight distillation.
The architecture of a new DNN is defined as a transforma-
tion of the original network’s architecture based on a developer
provided transformation specification. As described in §III,
a specification designates layers to drop, layers to be down-
scaled to eliminate neurons, and layers to be transformed to
meet verifier requirements. DNN transformation proceeds by
propagating inter-layer constraints to produce a well-defined,
but untrained, DNN that is less complex than the original and
thereby facilitates verification.
This transformed DNN architecture is trained using knowl-
edge distillation which seeks to train the transformed DNN to
match the accuracy of the original, trained DNN [36]. Like
traditional training, distillation requires the specification of
training and test data sets and training parameters, such as
the specific loss function and stopping rules.
Unlike code refactoring, where exact preservation of observ-
able behavior is often a goal, the stochastic nature of DNN
training makes this difficult. However, for many applications
the behavior of a DNN is captured by its test error. Since the
distillation process drives training of the transformed DNN to
minimize its difference with the original, it preserves behavior
by trying to match the error of the networks.
R4V in Action: Fig. 1 illustrates how DNN refactoring can
help the developers of the DAVE-2 network verify properties
and achieve desired error using a binary-search on the com-
plexity of refactored DNNs. We illustrate this by referencing
data on refactored versions of DAVE-2 reported in Fig. 5.
The original DAVE-2 network computes steering angles
from images using a 13 layer DNN comprised of 82669
neurons. Unfortunately, on average it takes 20,000 seconds to
run the state-of-the-art Neurify [19] verifier to check a single
property and even then the verifier returns an unknown result –
it is unable to prove or disprove property conformance. Fig 1
depicts the error of the network and its verification time with
an unfilled square and a filled square, respectively. The high-
cost of verifying this network means it is too complex and we
should refactor it to reduce its complexity.
An extreme aggresive refactoring might drop 6 of the
layers resulting in a very small DNN with only 161 neurons,
denoted 56 89A1. This refactored DNN is easy to verify,
taking only 30 seconds on average, which we depict as a
filled diamond. Unfortunately, this network lacks sufficient
complexity to match the training data. Its error, which we
denote with a diamond, has an MSE of 0.062 relative to
the original network – this network has not preserved the
original networks behavior. Clearly refactoring has swung too
far towards low DNN complexity.
Directing refactoring back towards greater complexity splits
the difference between the first two networks by dropping only
fewer layers. The resulting 8 layer DNN, 01 56789A, has
74045 neurons. On average, properties of this network can
be verified in 5000 seconds and it achieves a relative Mean
Squared Error (MSE) of 0.008. If tmax and emax are 3 hours
and a relative MSE of 0.01 then, as depicted by the filled and
unfilled circles, this refactored network would lie within the
complexity sweet spot. The ability to cost-effectively verify
DNN 01 56789A, allows developers to determine whether
it meets critical properties and, if so, to deploy since it has
acceptably low error.
The contributions of this work lie in (1) identifying the
1This DNN naming scheme uses “ ” to denote a dropped layer – the original
network would be denoted 0123456789A. Since DNN refactorings always
preserve the input and output layers we do not include them in the name.
notion of a complexity sweet spot that allows developers to
balance DNN error and verifiability; (2) developing automated
DNN refactoring techniques that can be used to side-step
the limitations of existing DNN verifiers and adjust DNN
complexity to meet desired error and verification constraints;
and (3) demonstrating the potential of this approach on a
series of case studies using two substantial DNNs deployed in
autonomous systems and four state-of-the-art DNN verifiers.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we give background on DNNs, DNN verifi-
cation, and DNN distillation as a prelude to describing R4V.
A. Deep Neural Networks
A deep neural network N encodes an approximation of
a target function f : Rn → Rm. DNNs are comprised of
a sequence of layers, l0, l1, . . . , lk, where l0 has an input
domain of Rn, lk has an output domain of Rm, and the
output domain of li is the same as the input domain of
li+1. Each layer defines an independent function and the
overall network’s function approximation is their composition
lk ◦ lk−1 . . . ◦ l0. As discussed below, layers may vary in their
internal structure, but all are comprised of a set of neurons that
accumulate a weighted sum of other neurons and then apply
an activation function (e.g., ReLU, Sigmoid) to the neuron
output to introduce non-linearity.
The literature on machine learning has developed a broad
range of layer types and explored the benefits of different
layer combinations in realizing accurate approximations of
different target functions, e.g., [37]. For instance, layer types
have been defined that specialize in processing input im-
age data, e.g., convolutional and max pooling, in providing
flexible expressive power for function approximation, e.g.,
fully-connected, and in producing output classifications, e.g.,
softmax. A layer is defined by instantiating a layer type
with parameter definitions. For instance, a convolutional layer
type might define the size of its input, the number of output
channels, its kernel size, and its stride.
Layers can also have a more complex structure, with
branches of computation that are recombined to produce the
layer output. For example, residual blocks, e.g., [38], have 2
computation paths. One path applies a set of computations,
such as convolution and batch normalization, while the other
path is an identity function, mapping the input to the final re-
combination operation. The two paths are combined by adding
their outputs. In this work we represent these complex blocks
as block(C, S), where C is the recombination operation (e.g.
Add) and S is the set of computation paths. Residual blocks
can be represented using this notation as block(Add, {I, f}),
where I is the identity operation, and f is the computation to
apply to the computation path.
The definition of a set of layers and their interconnec-
tions defines the architecture of the network. An architecture
is trained using a population of labeled training data, D,
consisting of training instances, (x, y). Training instances
are evaluated, N (x), and the loss relative to the expected
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Fig. 3: DNN Distillation
output, y, is used to drive a gradient-descent process, called
backpropagation, which updates the network weights based
on their degree of contribution to the loss. The term training
parameters refers collectively to the set of choices made in
instantiating this training process, including: how the (x, y)
are sampled from D, the loss function (e.g., mean squared
error, cross entropy), and when to stop training.
The accuracy of the network estimates the degree to which
N (x) ≈ f(x) by computing the percentage of labels that are
matched by N on a set of labeled instances that are disjoint
from D. It can be measured to determine the progress of train-
ing, e.g., validation accuracy, or to determine generalization of
the network after training is completed, e.g., test accuracy. The
error of a network is 1 minus its accuracy.
B. DNN Verification
Given a network N and a correctness property, φ, that
defines a set of constraints over the inputs φx, and a set of
constraints over the outputs φy , verification of N seeks to
prove: ∀x ∈ Rn φx(x)⇒ φy(N (x)).
A widely studied class of properties express the local
robustness of a DNN. Such properties state that inputs within
an -ball centered at x should be mapped to the same value,
∀δ ∈ [0, ]n N (x) = N (x± δ), where n is the dimension of
x. For example, a network that classifies road signs should
still classify an image of a stop sign correctly, even after a
small amount of noise is applied to the image.
A recent survey [39] describes a variety of algorithmic ap-
proaches for verifiying such properties. Reachability methods
that calculate approximations of the sets of values that can be
computed as output of the network given an input constraint in-
clude: MaxSens [10], Ai2 [11], DeepGo [12], and ERAN [13],
[40], [41]. Methods that formulate property violations as
a threshold for an objective function and use optimization
algorithms to determine failure to meet that threshold include:
MIPVerify [14], ILP [15], Duality [16], ConvDual [17], and
Certify [18]. Search methods that explore regions of the input
space where they then formulate reachability or optimization
sub-problems include: Neurify [19], ReluVal [20], Fast-lin&
Fast-lip [21], DLV [22], CROWN [42], CNN-CERT [23],
Sherlock [24], Bab [25], ReLuplex [8], and Planet [9]. In
§IV we report on the use of four of these DNN verifiers in
combination with R4V.
Original DroNet linearize drop(0) drop(2) drop(3) Refactored
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Fig. 4: Refactoring the DroNet DNN.
C. Network Distillation
Hinton et al. [36] introduced knowledge distillation as a
general approach to addressing the differing requirements in
training and deploying DNNs (e.g., less computation, lower
energy consumption). Distillation has proven useful in address-
ing varied deployment requirements [43], [44], [45]. In R4V,
we employ distillation to address the requirement that DNNs
be verified prior to deployment in safety critical systems.
As depicted in Fig. 3, distillation trains a student DNN
to match the accuracy of an trained teacher DNN. Training
inputs, x, are fed to each network. In traditional training, loss
would be computed between the label y – a hard training target
– and the output inferred by the network being trained, s(x).
Distillation can also include differences in soft training targets
in computing loss. Soft targets are vectors of values computed
in the output layers of the networks,
−−−→
ot(x) and
−−−→
os(x); for
classification networks these would be the normalized logits in
the softmax layer. The computed loss drives backpropagation
to update the student’s weights, but the addition of soft targets
can better help the student match the accuracy of the teacher.
III. APPROACH
The goal of our approach, R4V, is to increase the appli-
cability and scalability of verification through refactoring –
transferring the knowledge of a complex DNN into a smaller
simpler network that is more amenable to verification. In this
section we discuss the components of R4V, as outlined in
Fig. 2, describe its implementation, and present recommenda-
tions on how to systematize its application.
A. Transforming DNN Architecture
Different strategies can be applied to reduce the complexity
of a DNN. We define a simple set of transformations over
DNN layers. These transformations permit dropping layers,
scaling layers, and changing certain types of layers that are
not supported by verification tools. We also define a utility
operation to apply transformations to layers that satisfy a given
predicate.
Drop layers: The drop layer operation (Eq. 1) takes in a set
of layer indices L, and removes those layers from the DNN.
drop(L) :∀l ∈ L l′ = ⊥ (1)
After dropping a layer, the output shape of the preceding layer
is used to update successive layers, to ensure that the new ar-
chitecture is valid. The drop operation can be applied to layers
that perform some computation on their input. We prohibit its
application to the output layer to ensure that the transformed
architecture produces outputs with the same dimensions as
the original architecture. We also prohibit dropping reshaping
layers, such as Transpose and Flatten, since they are required
to ensure that the input to a layer are the correct shape.
Scale layers: The scale layer operation (Eq. 2) takes in a
set of layer indices L, and a scale factor f , and scales the
number of neurons in each specified layer by the factor f .
scale(L, f) :∀l ∈ L (l 6= ⊥)→ (#l′ = bf ·#lc) (2)
where # denotes the size of a layer. After scaling a layer, its
new output shape is used to update the parameterization of
successive layers, to ensure that the new architecture is valid.
Our current framework supports the scale operation on the
input layer, fully-connected layers, and convolutional layers.
Fully-connected layers are scaled by changing the number
of neurons in the layer. Convolutional layers are scaled by
changing the number of kernels. The input layer is scaled by
its height and width dimensions.
Linearize layers: In general, residual blocks have one path
that performs a computation on the input, and a second path
that performs the identity operation, or resizes the input to
match the output shape of the computation path. The linearize
operation removes the non-computation path from the residual
block so that the layer involves a single path. It (Eq. 3) takes
a set of indices L of residual layers, and removes the identity
connection from each.
linearize(L) :∀l ∈ L l = block(Add, {I, f})→ l′ = f (3)
Forall layers: We also define a utility operation forall
(Eq. 4), that applies a partially parameterized operation λ over
all layers of a DNN N , that satisfy predicate ϕ.
forall(N , ϕ, λ) = λ({l ∈ N | ϕ(l)}) (4)
Fig. 4 illustrates the individual transformations resulting
from this composition of operators:
forall(forall(DroNet, isResidual , linearize),
isLayer({0, 2, 3}), drop)
where isResidual and isLayer are predicates that determine
whether a layer is residual and whether a layer’s identifier
is in a specified set, respectively. The colors in the figure
depict different layer types and their height corresponds to the
number of neurons. The transformation is non-trivial, because
whenever a layer’s shape is modified the adjacent layers have
to be updated.
We have applied and investigated these operations individ-
ually and in combination over several networks, including the
ones that we report on in §IV. We have considered extending
the transformation framework with additional capabilities, for
example, to add a layer. To date, however, we have focused on
capabilities that reduce the complexity of refactored networks
– adding layers works against that goal – and that are necessary
to support existing DNN verifiers.
B. Distilling Weights in the Transformed DNN
We employ knowledge distillation to refactor DNNs that
retain accuracy relative to the original network. Since distil-
lation is a flexible, highly parameterized, DNN cross-training
framework, our approach identifies three degrees of freedom
in adapting distillation for verification.
Datasets. These nominally include training, validation, and
test sets. Usually, the sets used on the teacher will be used
on the student as well. However, R4V supports the utilization
of different sets that may be needed to, for example, accel-
erate distillation or performing additional checks on external
representativeness.
Training parameters. As with other DNN training ap-
proaches, there is a large hyperparameter space for tuning
performance. Our approach has been to adopt the training
parameters of the original network as a starting point. For
refactoring classification networks, we follow prior work be-
ginning with Hinton et al. [36], and incorporate soft targets,
but hard targets can be used to provide additional information
for computing loss. For refactoring regression networks, we
distill strictly using the outputs of the teacher as hard targets.
Stopping rules. In addition to establishing a timeout for
distillation, R4V can terminate distillation when the relative
student-teacher error is below a given threshold. For example,
in a regression setting, the MSE between the teacher and
student outputs may be used to measure relative accuracy.
Once parameterized, R4V trains the student network auto-
matically. The resulting network can be assessed for accuracy
and subjected to property verification.
C. Implementation
Our implementation of R4V consists of two main compo-
nents: a transformation component, and a distillation com-
ponent. Both components are parameterized using a single
configuration file, specified using the TOML language [46],
such as the one shown in Listing 1.
The transformation component is parameterized with a
teacher architecture and a set of transformation strategies. The
teacher model is specified using the Open Neural Network
Exchange (ONNX) format [47], which can be produced from
many of the most popular machine learning frameworks.
The configuration file in Listing 1 will transform the teacher
architecture (specified in lines 22-25) by dropping layers 2 and
3 (lines 26-27), linearizing all residual blocks in the network
(lines 28-30), and scaling the first layer by a factor 0.5 (lines
31-33). After transforming the architecture, the R4V tool will
automatically begin distillation.
The distillation component was implemented in Python,
with PyTorch as the underlying machine learning frame-
work [48] used for training. The default distillation settings
Listing 1: An example R4V configuration file.
1 [ d i s t i l l a t i o n ]
2 maxmemory="32G"
3 threshold=0.01
4 type="regression"
5 [ d i s t i l l a t i o n . parameters ]
6 epochs=100
7 optimizer="adam"
8 loss="MSE"
9 [ d i s t i l l a t i o n . data ]
10 format="dronet"
11 batchsize=32
12 [ d i s t i l l a t i o n . data . transform ]
13 grayscale=true
14 [ d i s t i l l a t i o n . data . t r a i n ]
15 shuffle=true
16 student.path="artifacts/dronet.200/training"
17 teacher.path="artifacts/dronet.200/training"
18 [ d i s t i l l a t i o n . data . v a l i d a t i o n ]
19 shuffle=false
20 student.path="artifacts/dronet.200/validation"
21 teacher.path="artifacts/dronet.200/validation"
22 [ d i s t i l l a t i o n . t e a c h e r ]
23 model="networks/dronet/model.onnx"
24 input_shape=[1, 200, 200, 1]
25 input_format="NHWC"
26 [ [ d i s t i l l a t i o n . s t r a t e g i e s . drop layer ] ]
27 layer_id=[2, 3]
28 [ [ d i s t i l l a t i o n . s t r a t e g i e s . f o r a l l ] ]
29 layer_type="ResidualConnection"
30 strategy="linearize"
31 [ [ d i s t i l l a t i o n . s t r a t e g i e s . s c a l e l a y e r ] ]
32 layer_id=[0]
33 factor=0.5
are based on the knowledge distillation method of Hin-
ton et al. [36], and can be configured through the configu-
ration file provided by the user. R4V allows users to choose
the training algorithm and loss function (lines 7 and 8), as
well as set hyper parameters such as the learning rate, and
the batch size (line 11). We also extend distillation with a
relative-performance-based stopping criteria (such as the error
threshold specified in line 3), as well as a memory limit (line 2)
and timeout. These permit developers to enforce a distillation
budget to allow for fast partial distillation training to rapidly
explore the space of refactorings; something we plan to explore
in more depth in future work. Our distillation procedure also
allows for different datasets to be specified for the student
and the teacher (lines 14-21). This allows the student to be
trained on smaller input sizes or on inputs that have been
pre-processed differently than the teacher. For example, in the
second case study below, we transform the DroNet network to
operate on smaller input sizes, so we update lines 16 and 20 to
point to a pre-processed dataset with the smaller image sizes.
The distilled student model is saved in the ONNX format.
We also developed several tools for translating the ONNX
models to the input formats required by the verifiers used in
this work. §IV provides details on these translators.
We will make our implementation and study artifacts avail-
able before the work is published.
D. Recommended Practices
Our experience to date with R4V has led to several broad,
and likely evolving, recommended practices to explore the
space of DNN refactorings possible with the approach.
First, the configuration language provides a simple and
unified way to specify architectural transformations, and R4V
removes potential errors associated with the transformation
itself by automating this process. Still, when specifying ar-
chitectural transformations, a developer may be challenged to
identify the complexity sweet spot given the possible number
of applicable transformations. We recommend to initially use a
binary search to explore the complexity spectrum, starting with
the original network and applying coarse drop transformations
to generate networks with half the complexity and determine
whether the accuracy and verifiability rendered are acceptable.
Once the sweet spot is identified, further transformations can
be applied to refine this initial approximation. For example,
scale transformations can provide finer gradations in DNN
complexity than using drop alone. We explore this recommen-
dation further in §V, and certainly a key part of future work
is to provide further support for this search process including
making the binary search process multidimensional to account
not just for the number of layers to drop but also for the layer
type and its location in the DNN.
Second, the configuration language provides a means to
specify how the distillation process should work, including
training and validation data sets, loss functions, and training
parameters. With regard to datasets for R4V, we advocate a
strategy of exploiting, whenever available, datasets used for
the original network. The intuition here is that the knowledge
learned by the teacher, has been informed by repeated appli-
cation of training data from those sets and distilling will effect
the transfer of that well-informed knowledge to the student.
Third, the sweet spot is likely to vary across verifiers.
As described in §II, many verifiers are emerging with dif-
ferent underlying approaches that may present performance
and applicability tradeoffs, and it is unlikely that a single
best verifier across the space of DNNs and properties will
emerge. To address such richness, we recommend an R4V
portfolio approach, where an ensemble of strategies can be
employed to generate a portfolio of refactored networks, each
of which can then be subjected to verification by a portfolio
of verifiers. Selection of the best refactored DNN, e.g., the
most accurate verifiable network, can be made from the
portfolio results. Furthermore, such refactoring and verification
portfolios would be comprised of independent tasks which can
be easily parallelized – a practice employed in conducting the
case studies discussed in §IV.
IV. STUDY
This section sets up the three case studies we conduct to
explore the potential of R4V to support DNN verification.
The first case study focuses on Verifier Applicability. Veri-
fiers are constantly playing catch-up to the latest architectural
features introduced for DNNs. As a result, it is common to
find that a favorite verifier does not support the features of
a network of interest. For example, some verifiers, such as
CROWN and ReluVal, are restricted to fully connected layers.
Other verifiers, such as MIPVerify and DeepGo, add support
for convolutional and maxpooling, but cannot handle more
TABLE I: Case Studies
Case Study Artifacts Verifier
Verifier Applicability DAVE-2 ReLuplex
DroNet ERAN
Verification Efficiency DAVE-2 Neurify
DroNet Planet
Error-Verifiability Trade-offs DAVE-2 Neurify
complex layers such as residual blocks. In this case study,
we showcase how R4V can be used to overcome this kind of
limitation by refactoring the network to one that satisfies the
verifiers feature constraints.
The second case study focuses on Verifier Efficiency. When
faced with modern complex networks, even when verifiers can
support all the features in a network, they often struggle to
provide results in actionable time. In such cases R4V can
be used to refactor the network into one that can be verified
significantly more efficiently.
The third case study focuses on Error-Verifiability Trade-
offs. While the first two studies investigate verification appli-
cability and efficiency enabled by R4V under a small number
of refactorings, this study provides a much broader exploration
of the refactoring space. It does so by performing a binary
search for refactored versions of the original DNNs that lie
in the complexity sweet spot where error and verification time
meet acceptable thresholds, and then it follows up with a more
extensive characterization providing concrete evidence of the
tradeoffs illustrated earlier in the paper.
The studies are performed on two large DNN artifacts,
four state-of-the-art verifiers, and multiple refactored DNNs
in order to provide a broader characterization of the approach.
Table I summarizes the case studies and how they pair
networks and verifiers.
A. Artifacts
The study applies R4V to two large DNN artifacts used
for autonomous vehicles, DAVE-2 and DroNet, both with
more than 10 layers of different types, and an average of
250,000 neurons respectively. Prior DNN verification efforts
have typically focused on relatively simple DNNs (e.g., ACAS
has 8 layers and hundreds of neurons [8], MNIST has four
layers and thousands of neurons [9]) or manually simplified
versions of larger DNNs (e.g., a version of DAVE-2 with
half of the layers [49]) to assess their performance. Our goal
is to explore the performance of R4V under modern and
challenging DNNs that push the state-of-the-art.
DAVE-2 is trained to drive an autonomous ground vehicle.
The DAVE-2 architecture [26] is made up of over 80000
neurons spread over 13 layers, including five convolutional
layers and four fully connected layers, and was designed to
provide steering control for an autonomous car. Because the
original trained DAVE-2 model is not publicly available, in
this study we use the model trained by other researchers [50]
with the Udacity self-driving car dataset [51]. The dataset
is comprised of 101,396 training images (of which we use
90% for training, and 10% for validation) and 15837 test
images. Images are taken from three cameras (center, left,
right) looking out the windshield of a car. For each image,
there is also a corresponding steering angle, indicating the
position of the steering wheel at the time the image was taken.
The DAVE-2 model that we use was trained by Pei et al. [50]
on color images that were scaled down to a height and width
of 100 by 100. We use the same input pre-processing when
refactoring the network. The resulting network has a MSE of
0.008.
Following the process of Neurify [49], we randomly gen-
erated 10 safety properties for the DAVE-2 networks. The
properties specify that images with a Chebyshev distance
of at most 2 from a given test image must produce an
output steering angle within a target range. Different from
Neurify [49], in order to make the properties independent of
an individual network, we use the test data label as the target
steering angle. Another difference is that we restricted the
output to a tighter range (from ±30 to ±10 degrees) to make
it more realistic for the problem domain.
DroNet is trained to provide control signals for an autonomous
drone [27]. DroNet is based on the ResNet architecture, and
is made up of a convolutional and maxpooling layer, followed
by 3 residual blocks, and a fully connected layer, totalling
over 475,000 neurons. It consumes a 200x200 grayscale image
and outputs a steering angle, as well as a probability that the
drone is about to collide with an obstacle. The model is trained
on a modified version of the Udacity self-driving car dataset.
The dataset only uses the images from the center camera,
and their corresponding steering angles from the Udacity
dataset. It augments these examples with a set of images taken
from a camera mounted to a bicycle as it is ridden on the
streets of a city. These images each have a label indicating a
corresponding probability of collision. The resulting network
has a MSE of 0.021 on steering angle and an accuracy of
0.983 on collision avoidance.
We randomly generated 20 safety properties for the DroNet
networks, 10 for the steering angle regression task, and 10 for
the collision probability classification task. Similarly to the
properties for DAVE-2, the DroNet steering properties specify
that images within a Chebyshev distance of 2 of a given test
image must produce a steering angle within 10 degrees of
the steering angle of the original. The collision probability
properties specify that images within a Chebyshev distance of
2 of a given test image must produce a collision classification
that is the same as the target classification.
B. Verifiers
Given our studies’ objectives, we selected the following
verifiers ReLuplex, ERAN, Neurify, and Planet. ReLuplex
and Planet are the most studied DNN verifiers, while ERAN
and Neurify represent the state-of-the-art. All these verifiers
also have freely available open source implementations. The
ReLuplex verifier is based on an adaptation of the simplex
method that provides support for DNN architectures with
fully-connected layers with ReLU activation functions. The
ERAN verifier uses abstract interpretation to overapproximate
the reachable output region. In this study we use ERAN with
the DeepPoly abstract domain, which can handle convolu-
tional, fully-connected, and maxpooling layers with ReLU,
tanh, or sigmoid activation functions [40]. The Neurify verifier
combines symbolic interval analysis with symbolic linear
relaxation, and supports convolutional and fully-connected
layers with ReLU activations. The Planet verifier blends tech-
niques from SMT and search, and supports layers that can be
specified as a linear combination of neurons, as well as ReLU
activations and maxpooling layers.
For each verifier, we wrote a translation tool to convert
networks in the ONNX format (the output format of R4V)
to the specific input format required by each verifier.
Both ReLuplex and Planet take in a single file that combines
a description of the network and the property specification. In
the ‘nnet’ file format of ReLuplex, the property is encoded
as a set of layers on the end of the network. The types of
properties supported by this format are ones in which the
input constraints are intervals, and the output constraint is a
linear inequality over the output neurons. In the ‘rlv’ format
used by Planet, layers of a network are specified as linear
combinations of neurons, and the property is specified as a list
of linear assertions, with each input required to have a lower
and upper bound. We wrote translation tools to combine an
ONNX network and property into the corresponding file type.
For ReLuplex, we support translating networks comprised only
of fully connected layers. For Planet, we support translating
any networks comprised of fully connected and convolutional
layers with ReLU activations, as well as maxpooling, batch
normalization, and residual blocks.
Rather than combining the network and property into a
single file, Neurify and ERAN take in both a network speci-
fication and several parameters to specify the property to be
checked, such as the input and output bounds. The extended
‘nnet’ format used by Neurify accepts networks composed of
convolutional and fully connected layers that must have ReLU
activations. The ERAN verifier accepts networks specified
as a subset of the operations in the TensorFlow machine
learning framework. We built translation tools to convert the
ONNX models output by R4V to the network specification
format accepted by each verifier. For Neurify, we support
translating networks comprised of convolutional and fully
connected layers. For ERAN, we support fully connected and
convolutional layers with ReLU or sigmoid activations, as well
as batch normalization layers, by converting them to fully
connected layers.
For some of the verifiers we had to make small modifica-
tions to get the tool to work on the artifacts used in this study.
For ReLuplex, we use the version of the tool modified by [25]
to support generic properties. This version of the tool works by
checking whether the output neuron is less than 0. Properties
can be specified by encoding them as a set of layers at the
end of the network being verified. Because the Neurify tool is
hard coded to check a constant set of properties, we modified
the version of the tool built to operate on DAVE-2 for use in
our study. We made the tool more general by allowing a user
specified input and output interval to be specified at runtime.
Finally, we modified ERAN to support regression networks.
The original tool was designed to verify robustness properties
for classification networks. We made modifications to the tool
to return the lower and upper bounds that it had computed
for the outputs. We then checked whether these bounds were
within the bounds specified by the property.
C. Methodology
For each case study, we use R4V to refactor the original
DNN. The transformations in each scenario are meant to
demonstrate how R4V can be applied to increase verifiability.
Distillation parameters are set to correspond to the training
parameters reported for the original DAVE-2 and DroNet,
including the number of epochs we used (50 for DAVE-2
and 100 for DroNet), the optimization method (Adadelta for
DAVE-2 and Adam for DroNet), and the batch size (256
for DAVE-2 and 32 for DroNet). After training, we select
the model from the epoch with the best mean squared error
(MSE) performance (relative to the teacher), evaluated on the
validation set. For DAVE-2, the performance is measured as
the MSE with respect to the target steering angle. Because
DroNet has 2 outputs, we report the performance as 2 values:
the MSE with respect to the target steering angle, and the
accuracy with respect to the probability of collision.
For each scenario in each case study, we use the correspond-
ing verifier to check the safety properties described above
on the corresponding refactored network. We measure the
verification time and report the verification results (true, false,
unknown, “out of resources” (OOR)) as well as the mean and
standard deviation of the verification time.
Distillation took around 11 hours on average to complete
all the epochs. Note that we made no effort to optimize this
time, such as using early stopping or transfer learning. As
an example of the potential for optimization, the average best
epoch for the accuracy-verifiability trade-off study below was
37 (out of 50 total). This suggests that simply using early
stopping would have reduced distillation time by 20%. More
aggressive training optimizations, such as those used in neural
architecture search [52], apply a strict training budget, e.g., 5%
of the epochs, when making preliminary assessments about the
suitability of an architecture and then only using larger budgets
for very promising architectures. This would work well for the
approach described in Case Study III and would reduce the
time for most distillation runs to a matter of minutes.
Distillation was run on GPU computing nodes with 64GB
of memory, and using NVIDIA 1080Ti GPUs for network
training. Verification tasks were run on compute nodes with
2.3GHz Xeon processors and 64GB of memory running Cen-
tOS Linux 7. Verification tasks had a time out of 24 hours.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of each case study.
TABLE II: Results for Case Study I.
Property Mean Verif.
Count Time (sec.)
Artifact/Verifier T F U O
O
R
T F U
DAVE-2/ReLuplex DAVE-2 Not Supported by ReLuplex
R4V(DAVE-2)/ReLuplex 10 0 0 0 52 - -
DroNet/ERAN DroNet Not Supported by ERAN
R4V(DroNet)/ERAN 8 12 0 0 519 525 -
A. Verification Applicability
Artifacts and Verifiers. This case study pairs the DAVE-2 and
DroNet artifacts with the ReLuplex and ERAN (using the
DeepPoly abstract domain) verifiers. The pairing is designed to
showcase the potential value of R4V to overcome a verifier’s
limited support for certain DNN features. The original DAVE-
2 network has several convolutional layers, which are not
supported by ReLuplex. The original DroNet network has
complex residual blocks. ERAN, however, does not support
residual blocks when using the DeepPoly domain (indeed this
increasingly common layer type is only supported by a limited
set of verifers, e.g., CNN-Cert).
Refactoring. Since ReLuplex only supports fully-connected
layers, DAVE-2 must be refactored to remove all its con-
volutional layers. The refactoring uses the transformation
drop({0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) to remove all unsupported layers, leaving
only the final 5 fully-connected layers. To enable ERAN
(DeepPoly) to run on DroNet, we first drop the convolutional
and maxpooling layers at the beginning of DroNet, as well
as the last 2 residual blocks through drop({0, 2, 3}). We then
linearize the remaining residual connection linearize({1}).
The distillation for both artifacts uses the parameters described
in the previous section, resulting in a refactored DAVE-2 with
an MSE of 0.062 relative to the original (other refactorings of
DAVE-2 that render much smaller errors are presented in the
last case study) , and a refactored DroNet with a relative MSE
on the steering angle of 0.020 and a relative accuracy on the
collision avoidance of 0.979.
Findings. The results from this case study are shown in
Table II. The first column of this table is the paired artifact and
verifier, the next four columns are the number of properties
that were checked that resulted in either proving or falsifying
the property, returning unknown, or running out of resources.
The next three columns show the mean verification time across
all properties for each result type.
While ReLuplex can not be applied to the original DAVE-2
artifact, and ERAN (DeepPoly) could not be applied to the
original DroNet artifact, both verifiers could be applied to the
refactored networks. In the case of DAVE-2 and ReLuplex, all
10 properties where shown to hold in less than a minute per
property. In the case of DroNet and ERAN (DeepPoly), the
refactoring enabled the verification of all 20 properties, eight
deemed true and 12 deemed false, taking on the order of 10
minutes to complete the verification of each property.
The most significant finding is that R4V enabled the
application of previously inapplicable verifiers.
TABLE III: Results for Case Study II
Property Mean Verif.
Count Time (sec.)
Artifact/Verifier T F U O
O
R
T F U
DAVE-2/Neurify 0 0 10 0 - - 20318*
R4V(DAVE-2)/Neurify 10 0 0 0 2449 - -
DroNet/Planet 0 0 0 20 - - -
R4V(DroNet)/Planet 1 2 0 17 1155 45423 -
B. Verification Efficiency
Artifacts and Verifiers. This case study pairs DAVE-2 and
DroNet with the Neurify and Planet verifiers. These verifiers
can run these networks, but on the original architectures
Neurify takes on average over 5.6 hours to check a single
property while Planet cannot verify any DroNet property
within 24 hours.
Refactoring. To improve the efficiency of Neurify on the
DAVE-2 network, we apply R4V to refactor DAVE-2 by ap-
plying the transformation drop({2, 3, 4, 7, 9}), which matches
the one manually generated by [49]. To increase the efficiency
of Planet on DroNet, we apply R4V to remove the first convo-
lutional and maxpooling layers, as well as the last two residual
blocks (drop({0, 2, 3})). We also scale the size of the input
layer to a 10 by 10 grayscale image (scale({input}, 0.05)).
This last step is necessary to enable planet to verify any of
the properties within the time limit.
Findings. The results from this case study are summarized
in Table III. The first column of this table is the artifact
and verifier pair, the next four columns are the number of
properties that were checked that resulted in either proving or
falsifying the property, or returning unknown or running out of
resources. The next three columns show the mean verification
time for each kind of returned result.
While Neurify could mostly handle the original DAVE-
2 network, its results were flaky for some properties, al-
ternating segmentation errors with verification completions.
Hence, the reported numbers on the original DAVE-2 with
Neurify correspond to the best of up to five tries. But even
when Neurify completed its execution after an average of 339
minutes per property, the complexity of the original network
introduced significant imprecision into the analysis, causing all
10 property checks to return an unknown result. In contrast,
Neurify was able to return true for all properties of the
refactored network, taking about 41 minutes on average to
verify a property - an 8 times speedup.
Similarly, although Planet can accept the original DroNet
architecture, it could not complete any of the property checks
within one day. After applying R4V to refactor the network,
Planet was able to finish checking three out of the 10 proper-
ties, taking just under 20 minutes to verify a property and a
little over 16.5 hours to falsify a property.
The most significant finding is that R4V can speed up
the verification time and enable verifiers to provide more
useful results.
C. Accuracy and Verifiability Trade-offs
Artifacts and Verifiers. In this case study, we explore the error-
verifiability trade-offs using the DAVE-2 architecture and the
Neurify verifier. We generate multiple refactored versions of
DAVE-2 to explore the trade-offs.
Refactoring. We start our exploration of the refactoring space
using the coarser granularity transformation drop, and per-
forming a binary search to determine the number of layers
to drop based on the refactored network error and verification
time. We arbitrary set the acceptable error in terms of the
MSE relative to the original network to be under 0.01. In
terms of verifiability, we require for all the properties to be
verified as true or falsified in under three hours.
Findings. The binary search process we followed is summa-
rized in Table IV. The first column describes the search action
taken in terms of the refactoring operation. The second column
shows the name of the network. In DAVE-2 the first five layers
are convolutional layers, layers five and six are reshaping lay-
ers, which cannot be modified by R4V, and the last four layers
are fully-connected. The name of each network includes all of
the layers that are kept after transformation, and replaces the
names of dropped layers with an underscore. The third column
shows one measure of the network complexity in terms of the
number of neurons. The fourth column shows the relative mean
square error when compared with the original network. The
fifth column provides a summary of the verification outcome
(more details are provided next). The last column contains the
assessment to guide the search process.
The process shows how a systematic binary search, starting
from the original network and repeatedly bisecting the space
towards the direction that seems to offer the best tradeoffs,
renders a refactored network 0123456 9A that performs
according the target criteria. This network can verify all 10
properties in less than three hours per property and do so
while retaining the behavior of the original network with a
MSE under 0.01. The process also hints at how even when
considering a single transformation, many options arise for
exploration and refinement, including some options that we
have illustrated and others that we have yet to explore such as
the combination of drop with scale transformations.
To complement the data in Table IV and to provide a more
extensive characterization of the space of tradeoffs involved
we use R4V to refactor the original network into another 11
networks. The results are depicted in Fig. 5. Each row in this
figure is a refactored network, and each column is a property
to verify. The networks names and their number of neurons
appears on the first and second column. The networks are
sorted by the number of neurons, so networks towards the
bottom of the plot are simpler. The size of the circle represents
the time to verify a given network and property, and the color
and pattern of the circle indicate the verification result. The
relative MSE of each network appears on the right of the plot.
Starting from the top, we notice that the original DAVE-
2 network takes over 10,000 seconds to verify every single
property, and for the second property as much as 39306
TABLE IV: Case Study III: Searching for Viable Architectures with R4V.
Search Action Network #Neurons Rel.MSE Verification Assessment
Start with existing network Original 82669 0.0 10/10 Unknowns Verification returns too many
Over 3 hours per property unknowns and takes too long 7
Drop all but one computation 56 A 11 0.062 Verified 10/10 in seconds Quickly verifiable but
layer error is too large 7
Drop 4 layers (convolutional) 0 56789A 56621 0.008 Verified 10/10 in less than 3 hours Verifiable but error is borderline 3
Drop 4 layers (fully-connected) 0123456 81345 0.008 Verifier cannot process Incompatible with verifier 7
Drop 2 layers (convolutional) 012 56789A 77933 0.005 Verified 6/10, 3 Unknowns, 1 TO Partially verifiable
Under 3 hours per property and acceptable error 7
Drop 2 layers (fully-connected) 0123456 9A 81405 0.003 Verified 10/10 Verifiable and
Just under 3 hours per property acceptable error 3
Fig. 5: Results for Case Study III
seconds, and in all cases it returns unknown. When R4V is
applied to refactor DAVE-2 by removing the fully-connected
layer labeled as ’7’ resulting in 0123456 89A (second row
in the graph), we observe a 2.1x speedup in verification time
and also more useful returned results (eight properties were
shown to be true, one unknown, and one timed-out). The
third row shows network 0123456 9A, which has another
fully-connected layer removed, resulting in a speedup of 3.6x
in verification time and all properties checked as true. The
following two rows of networks keep dropping fully-connected
layers, and when all fully-connected layers are dropped we
notice that Neurify returns an error as it cannot deal with
resulting architecture of 0123456 which is correct but
has no fully connected layers, which was unexpected by
Neurify. The following rows start the removal of convolutional
layers, resulting in another noticeable reduction in network
complexity. Network 01 56789A (highlighted in §I) renders
a speedup of 6.3x in verification time while retaining a MSE
of 0.008 relative to the original network. That is also the case
with 0 56789A, with 9.4x speedup and still an acceptable
error rate. The rows below have too large of an error to be
deemed viable.
In total, 3 of the 16 refactored DAVE-2 networks in Fig 5
meet the error-verifiability criteria, suggesting that the com-
plexity sweet spot for DAVE-2 contains a variety of acceptable
DNNs.
The most significant finding of this study is that, without
prior domain knowledge, R4V can enable the effective
exploration of the error and verifiability tradeoffs and
converge towards a network that meets both criteria.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed automated support for refactoring
DNNs to facilitate verification while retaining the behavior
of the original network. R4V couples specification-driven
architecture transformation support with knowledge distillation
to produce refactored DNNs. We demonstrate, through a series
of case studies, that R4V can help developers overcome the
limitations of individual DNN verification tools, reduce the
time to produce verification results, and, most importantly, to
navigate the accuracy-verifiability tradeoff to arrive at a net-
work that meets stated accuracy requirements and verification
budgets. These findings suggest that R4V has the potential
for improving the development of critical systems involving
DNNs, since refactored DNNs can be subjected to property
verification and have acceptable accuracy for deployment.
In future work, we plan to expand the range of refactorings,
e.g., adding add and replace operators, extend existing oper-
ations, e.g., linearization of dense networks, and supporting
additional optimizations, e.g., transferring weights from the
original network, using inexpensive training parameters during
the search for a good refactoring. In addition, we plan to
explore different strategies for automating the search for
refactored DNNs that lie within the complexity sweet spot,
which has the potential to make R4V broadly applicable by
practitioners.
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